Europe in 1944
Europe in 1944, before Operation Overlord, was a battlefield divided between a defensive but still formidable Germany, a Soviet Union on the offensive in the East, and Western Allies ready to open a second front in France to hasten the fall of the Third Reich. The war was at a decisive turning point, and the stakes were the liberation of occupied Europe. Here are some key dates from the first six months of 1944.
- January 4, 1944 – The Red Army invades Poland
- January 22 – Allied landing at Anzio, Italy
- March 3 – Soviet offensive in Ukraine
- March 19 – Hungary is occupied by Germany
- April 2 – Entry of the Red Army into Romania
- April 13 – Leclerc’s 2DB arrives for England
- May 9 – Liberation of Sevastopol by the Soviets
- June 4 – Capture of Rome by the Americans
- June 5 – French SAS parachute into Brittany
- June 6 – Allied landings in Normandy
Actors and forces present
Allied forces of Operation Overlord
On the eve of Operation Overlord, three million soldiers, including 1,7 million Americans, were assembled in England: 39 divisions, including 20 American, 14 British, 3 Canadian, 1 Polish, and 1 French. The air force had 11,600 aircraft, including 3,500 fighters and 5,000 bombers; and nearly 7,000 ships of all types were ready to sail for France. Operation Neptune, the naval assault of Overlord, was to allow five naval forces to approach the five chosen landing beaches from a staging area at sea (off the Isle of Wight) called Piccadilly Circus. Six divisions were to land at dawn on June 6: the 1st , 4th , and 29th American Infantry Divisions, the 50th and 3rd British Divisions, and the 3rd Canadian Division. Three other airborne units were scheduled to jump during the night of the 5th to the 6th on the two flanks of the landing zone: the British 6th Airborne and the American 82nd and 101st Airborne . A total of 170,000 men were to be quickly joined by 13 more divisions on D+1, then 17 more on D+3.
The German Supreme Command in the West
Hitler had long awaited the Allied landings in the West. The leaked results of the Tehran Conference confirmed his prediction for the spring of 1944: the invasion would come from the English Channel. Von Rundstedt, commanding the ground forces in the West and representing the old German army, had little confidence in the effectiveness of the Atlantic Wall and, like Hitler, dismissed the idea of a Normandy landing. His command was structured around two army groups: Army Group G south of the Loire, led by General von Blaskowitz, and Army Group B to the north, entrusted to Field Marshal Rommel since January 15, 1944. While von Rundstedt relied on the creation of reserve forces to be thrown against the aggressor, Rommel believed the Allies should be driven back into the sea in the first few hours. The Atlantic Wall would then play a decisive role. And for him, this was indeed the most dangerous area in Normandy. The armored forces were commanded by General von Schweppenburg, but only Hitler could decide on their deployment, just like Krancke's navy or Speerle's air force. These dysfunctions and the centralized nature of the command, centered solely on Hitler, would be sorely felt during the first days of operations in Normandy.
German forces in Normandy on June 6
Since his arrival on the Western Front, Field Marshal Rommel, notably in charge of inspecting the Atlantic Wall, had been constantly requesting reinforcements. Now convinced that the landings would take place in Normandy, Hitler sent him new troops in May 1944 to the Cotentin Peninsula (91st Division and 6th Parachute Regiment) and a division stationed in the Eure region (12th SS ). At the same time, units already in position moved closer to the future landing beaches (352nd Division ). With six infantry divisions and two armored divisions (21st and 12th SS ), the enemy had become even more formidable. But Hitler's division of command, which deprived the Western Command (including Rommel) of reserve units, sowed discord among the German generals and weakened their operational capabilities. For its part, the Luftwaffe, which had not controlled the air for a long time, could barely field more than 500 aircraft in Normandy.
The Atlantic Wall
Field Marshal von Rundstedt, who commanded the German land forces in the West, had to defend nearly 5 km of coastline. As early as June 000, the Germans had been content with coastal defenses between Calais and Boulogne, in preparation for the invasion of Great Britain. From December 1940, an exclusively defensive strategy was adopted, as the danger could come from the West. Construction of the Atlantic Wall began in early 1941 around the main ports and in Nord-Pas-de-Calais with the construction of submarine bases, batteries, bunkers, barracks, and radar stations. The stated objective of 1942 concrete points was, however, far from being achieved on the eve of D-Day. Only 15 structures had been completed by the end of 000.
In January 1944, Rommel, in charge of inspecting the Wall on the French coast, quickly highlighted the flaws in the defense system. In just a few months, he had more than 4 structures and 000 obstacles of all kinds built on the beaches and inland areas. In Normandy, 500 structures, 000 obstacles, and two million mines were in place before June 2. Despite this effort to make up for lost time, some structures were still not completed at the time of the D-Day landings. And the strategic differences between Rommel and von Rundstedt only slowed down the defense of the French coastline.
